



17th European Meeting on Game Theory

Virtual event

11-13 July 2022

Plenary speakers



Francis Bloch
Université Paris 1
Panthéon Sorbonne



Jean-Jacques Herings
Tilburg University



Marzena Rostek
University of Wisconsin-
Madison



Rajiv Vohra
Brown University

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July 11th

Session 1: 09:30-11:30

Applications I Room A	Environments Room B	Voting Room C	Political Economy Room D	Information I Room E
<p>Yigal Gerchak</p> <p><i>Two-stage contests and choice of levels of difficulty</i></p> <p>Fabio Lamantia</p> <p><i>Hybrid evolutionary games in industrial organization</i></p> <p>Erich Prisner</p> <p><i>Location Games on Trees</i></p> <p>David Lowing</p> <p><i>Sharing the Cost of a Gas Distribution Network.</i></p>	<p>María Ángeles Caraballo</p> <p><i>Dealing with competing goals in the reduction of pollutant emissions</i></p> <p>Andrea Caravaggio</p> <p><i>Water pricing and its allocation among heterogeneous end users in high and low seasons: a game theoretic approach</i></p> <p>Nadezhda Smirnova</p> <p><i>A payment scheme for sustaining cooperation in multistage games of renewable resource extraction</i></p>	<p>Hayrullah Dindar</p> <p><i>Vote swapping in irrisolute two-tier voting procedures</i></p> <p>Eric Kamwa</p> <p><i>On Two Voting systems that combine approval and preferences: Fall-back Voting and Preference Approval Voting</i></p> <p>Takaaki Abe</p> <p><i>Trade-off between Equality and Stability in Multi-group Voting Games</i></p>	<p>Marcelo de C. Griebeler</p> <p><i>Fear of communism: a political theory of land reform in democracies</i></p> <p>Federico Vaccari</p> <p><i>Influential News and Policy-making</i></p> <p>Jesus Sanchez-Ibrahim</p> <p><i>The Influence of Parties' Influence</i></p> <p>Satoshi Fukuda</p> <p><i>Who to Listen to?: A Model of Endogenous Delegation</i></p>	<p>Takashi Ui</p> <p><i>Impacts of Public Information on Flexible Information Acquisition</i></p> <p>Michiko Ogaku</p> <p><i>Mutual insurance for uninsurable income</i></p> <p>Wataru Kitano</p> <p><i>A Little Knowledge is a Dangerous Thing: Intentional Disregard under Sequential Persuasion</i></p> <p>Maxim Senkov</p> <p><i>Setting Interim Deadlines to Persuade</i></p>

Coffee Break

Plenary 1	12:00–13:00	(Plenary Room)	Chair: Riccardo Saulle
	Jean-Jacques Herings	Expectational Equilibria in Many-to-one Matching Models with Contracts	

Lunch Break

Session 2: 14:00-16:00

Applications II Room A	Matching Room B	Coalitions I Room C	Implementation Room D	Mechanism Room E
Matteo Broso <i>Mixed Duopoly under Product Differentiation and Political Connections</i>	Pietro Salmaso <i>Stable Sharing</i>	Núñez Lugilde <i>Priority coalitional games and claims problems</i>	Riccardo Saulle <i>Implementation in vNM Stable Set</i>	Harshika Dalakoti <i>Dissolving a bilateral partnership</i>
Marco Marini <i>Monopolistic Competition and Products Quality</i>	Pablo Neme <i>The lattice of worker-quasi-stable matchings</i>	Bas Dietzenbacher <i>Two-bound core games and the nucleolus</i>	Hector Hermida <i>A Generalised Implementation Problem</i>	Rocío Botta <i>Improving cooperation using incomplete fractional punishment</i>
Michael Kramm <i>The Interaction of Consumer Learning and Competition Intensity in a Differentiated Duopoly</i>	Md. Shahidul Islam <i>Fair and efficient matching under dichotomous preferences</i>	Dmitry Levando <i>Formation of coalition structures from non-cooperative actions of agents.</i>	Giacomo Rubbini <i>On Necessary Conditions for Implementation of Functions, without Rational Expectations</i>	Moran Koren <i>The Gatekeeper's Effect</i>
Antonio Di Bari <i>An Options Game Approach to Valuate Broadband Projects in a Smart City Context</i>		Robert Gilles <i>Generalised Gately values for cooperative games</i>	Ville Korpela <i>Behavioral Strong Implementation</i>	Matthew V. Leduc <i>On the Duration of Affirmative Action Policies</i>

Coffee Break

Plenary 2	16:30–17:30	(Plenary Room)	Chair: Michela Chessa
	Francis Bloch	Attack and interception in networks	

July 12th

Session 3: 9:30-11:00

Applications III	Dynamic Models	Coalitions II	Competition and Co-operation	Rationality
Room A	Room B	Room C	Room D	Room E
Michele Aleandri <i>A Lexicographic Public Good Ranking</i>	Alessandra Buratto <i>A dynamic model for native advertising</i>	Miguel Ángel Mirás Calvo <i>Coalitional-weighted Shapley values</i>	Roberto Rozzi <i>Does homophily impede human capital investments?</i>	Michele Crescenzi <i>Knowledge revision and aggregation in heterogeneous groups</i>
Sakib Anwar <i>A Group Public Goods Game with Position Uncertainty</i>	Antonin Macé <i>A Model of Repeated Collective Decisions</i>	Jochen Staudacher <i>Dynamic Programming for Computing Power Indices for Weighted Voting Games with Precoalitions</i>	Bianca Sanesi <i>Social stigma and status concerns can produce rational generosity</i>	Louis Gosart <i>How to Win at Final Jeopardy</i>
Izabella Stach <i>Voting power in corporate networks: Public Good Index</i>	Giovanni Villani <i>Punishments and sanctions for the International Environmental Agreements stability</i>	Marco Dell'Aglio <i>Comparing notions of group criticality: differential vs. minimal essential ranks</i>	Patrick Allmis <i>The Role of Confidence for Disputes</i>	Stefanie Schmitt <i>Quality investments and competition under limited attention to quality differences</i>

Coffee Break

Session 4: 11:30-13:00

Applications IV	Bargaining	Equilibrium	Social Choice I	Social Choice II	Applications V
Room A	Room B	Room C	Room D	Room E	Room F
Guennady Ougolnitsky <i>Comparative analysis of the efficiency of information structure in the game theoretic models of Cournot oligopoly</i>	Heyin Hou <i>The Price of Anarchy in the Bargaining Game</i>	Gisèle Umbhauer <i>Minimax-regret in the 11-20 money request game</i>	Stephane Gonzalez <i>Proportional methods for certification</i>	Federico Fioravanti <i>False-name-proof and strategy-proof voting rules under separable preferences</i>	Gustavo Saraiva <i>Search Steering in Two-Sided Platforms</i>
Eduardo Zúñiga <i>Stackelberg versus Cournot. A risk dominance approach.</i>	Maria Montero <i>Counterintuitive Comparative Statics in Legislative Bargaining</i>	Mehmet Ismail <i>The strategy of conflict and cooperation</i>	Kevin Techer <i>Priority relations and cooperation with multiple activity levels</i>	Agustín Bonifacio <i>Preference restrictions for simple and strategy-proof rules: local and weakly single-peaked domains</i>	Doriana Lingga <i>Tax and Subsidy Policies in a Two-sided Market with Heterogeneous Independent Products</i>
Michael Markus Trost <i>Unraveling the Spreading Pattern of Collusively Effective Competition Clauses</i>	Francesca Flamini <i>The Role of the Status-quo in Dynamic Bargaining</i>	Christian Dagnino <i>Testing Mixed-Strategy Nash Equilibria in penalty kicks: Literature review and case study on Italian amateur soccer leagues</i>	Clinton Gassi <i>Social acceptability and the majoritarian compromise rule.</i>	Gustavo Bergantiños <i>Broadcasting revenue sharing after cancelling sports competitions</i>	Amarjoti Mahanta <i>Emergence of Specialization in a Simple Production Economy</i>

Lunch Break

Session 5

14:00–16:00	14:00–16:00	14:00–16:00	14:00–16:00	14:00–16:00	14:00–16:00
Solution Concepts	Assignments	Mechanism Design	Networks	Information II	Learning
Room A	Room B	Room C	Room D	Room E	Room F
<p>Hamidreza Navidi <i>How bankruptcy rules influences investors' behavior</i></p>	<p>Loe Schlicher <i>How to optimally allocate rapid-response teams?</i></p>	<p>Andres Salamanca <i>Biased Mediators in Conflict Resolution</i></p>	<p>Andrea Di Liddo <i>The Shapley value as a measure of nodes' centrality in networks of networks</i></p>	<p>Seungjin Han <i>Designing a Competitive Monotone Signaling Equilibrium</i></p>	<p>Naoki Funai <i>Stochastic adaptive learning with committed players in games with strict Nash equilibria</i></p>
<p>Jesus Martinez <i>Allocation of greenhouse gases using bankruptcy methods</i></p>	<p>Alexey Kushnir <i>Undergraduate Course Allocation through Pseudo-Markets</i></p>	<p>Toygar Kerman <i>Information Design for Weighted Voting: A Cooperative Game Theory Approach</i></p>	<p>Encarnación Algaba <i>Some properties for cycle-free communication networks</i></p>	<p>Miguel Angel Roper Garcia <i>The Curse of Being Mediocre</i></p>	<p>Maria Carmela Ceparano <i>Global convergence of affine relaxations of the best response algorithm in ratio-bounded games</i></p>
<p>Guillaume Sekli <i>A cooperative game approach to integrated healthcare</i></p>	<p>Harborne Stuart <i>Stable Competition with Increasing Returns-to-Scale</i></p>	<p>Ece Teoman <i>How to Delegate the Choice of a Project</i></p>	<p>Gabriela Stockler <i>Asset Issuance Price and Networks of Secondary Markets</i></p>	<p>Wenji Xu <i>Market-Minded Informational Intermediary and Unintended Welfare Loss</i></p>	<p>Alex Possajennikov <i>"Greedy" Demand Adjustment in Cooperative Games</i></p>
<p>Yehuda Levy <i>Independence of Existence of Measurable Equilibrium Selection</i></p>	<p>Koji Yokote <i>Efficient, fair, and strategy-proof allocation of discrete resources under weak preferences and constraints</i></p>	<p>Yevgeny Tsodikovich <i>A Game of Second Opinions and The Humility Threshold</i></p>	<p>Alejandro Saavedra Nieves <i>Analysis of the cooperation in covert networks using games in partition function form</i></p>		

Coffee Break

Plenary 3	16:30–17:30	(Plenary Room)	Chair: Riccardo Saulle
	Marzena Rostek	Decentralized-Market Design	

SING Prize Announcement

July 13th

Session 6: 9:00-10:30

Matching	Mechanism	Assignments	Solution Concepts	Experiments	Cooperative Games
Room A	Room B	Room C	Room D	Room E	Room F
Atat Atay [Canceled] <i>Matching markets with middlemen under transferable utility</i>	Yigal Gerchak [Moved] <i>Two-stage contests and choice of levels of difficulty</i>	Tamás Solymosi <i>Computing the per-capita nucleolus in assignment games</i>	Aviad Heifetz <i>Pareto efficiency in affective interactions</i>	Orestis Trompounis <i>Communication and the emergence of a unidimensional world</i>	Satoshi Nakada <i>The Group-wise Egalitarian Owen Values</i>
Noelia Juarez <i>Core and stability notions in many-to-one matching markets with indifference</i>	Yizhaq Minchuk <i>Transfer Market - a Contest Theory Approach</i>	Umutcan Salman <i>Equity in centralized school choice</i>	Sam Ganzfried <i>Safe Equilibrium</i>	Naoki Watanabe <i>A Mouse-Tracking Bandit Experiment on Meaningful Learning in Weighted Voting</i>	Jose Antonio Garcia-Martinez <i>Cooperative Purchasing with General Discount: A Game Theoretical Approach</i>
Ozgun Kibris <i>Arbiter Assignment</i>	Berk Idem <i>Coexistence of Centralized and Decentralized Markets</i>	Xinyan Zhang <i>Matching and Labour Contracts under the New Normal</i>	Mikel Álvarez-Mozos <i>Solutions for Global Games</i>	Michela Chessa <i>An experiment on Demand Commitment Bargaining</i>	Takumi Kongo <i>Efficient and linear values that satisfy the equal treatment and weak null player out properties for cooperative games</i>

Coffee Break

Plenary 4	11:00–12:00	(Plenary Room)	Chair: Francesco Ciardiello
	Rajiv Vohra	Signaling, Screening, and Core Stability	

Closing Session: 12:00-12:15

SING Assembly

ZOOM LINKS

ROOM	LINK	PASSWORD
Plenary	Plenary Room	SING17
A	Room A	SING17A
B	Room B	SING17B
C	Room C	SING17C
D	Room D	SING17D
E	Room E	SING17E
F	Room F	SING17F